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Abstract
This paper will investigate whether or not the law school enrollment trends reflect economically responsive
supply behavior according to factors such as salary and other market indicators. Specifically, this paper will
determine whether or not the supply trends of law students reflect “cobweb-like” labor market adjustments
due to the time lag associated with entering the labor market. The second section will review the relevant
literature and provide a theoretical framework in which to analyze enrollment trends. In the third section, the
empirical model will be discussed and an explanation of the data will be given. The fourth section will provide
the results and conclusions of the paper.
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I. Introduction
In the late 1990’s, there was a noticeable trendof students who decided to skip graduateschool and take high paying jobs and big signing
bonuses at dot-com companies.  A strong job mar-
ket, coupled with rising tuition costs led many stu-
dents to consider the returns to a graduate school
education and many found the expected benefits of
entering the job market exceeding those of obtaining
a graduate degree.
Since the economic downturn of late 2001 to
present, there has been a surge in applications across
many post-graduate disciplines.  With opportunity
costs low, law schools have received more applica-
tions than ever before.  Appli-
cations are up 17.9% for
2002-2003, the biggest in-
crease in 20 years.  The Uni-
versity Of Connecticut Law
School saw an increase of 46%
since last year, receiving over
2,900 applications (Dale
2002).  The latest administra-
tion of the Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) re-
corded 66,906 registrations, up nearly 11% from last
year.  The Law School Admissions Council (LSAC)
is currently preparing for the largest LSAT adminis-
tration ever since the previous record set in the de-
scending economy of October 1991 (Vanderkam
2002).
As medical school applications stagnate, or
increase only by marginal amounts, why do law school
applications respond to macroeconomic indicators so
rapidly?  For one reason, the decision to go to medi-
cal school can not be made at the “spur of the mo-
ment” since entrance into medical school requires pre-
med or hard-science background and is a longer com-
mitment.  Students applying to law school come from
a variety of fields and do not have to participate in
personal interviews thus, making law school a popu-
lar choice for continuing education, but also a popu-
lar place to analyze labor market reactions.
Due to these changes in the returns to a legal
education, law school enrollments constantly fluctu-
ate.  Since there is a time lag between the decision to
enter law school and actual entrance into the labor
market, there may be boom and bust cycles in the
market for workers with a legal degree.  Labor mar-
ket adjustment of this type has been explained using
the “Cobweb Model,” which estimates the supply
trend of workers in highly technical occupations.
Because of the time lag nature
or the specialized occupation,
the supply adjustment often
overshoots, and then under-
shoots the long-run equilibrium
creating a “cobweb-like” trend
of market adjustment giving
the theory its name
(Ehrenberg, Smith 2002).
This paper will investigate whether or not the
law school enrollment trends reflect economically re-
sponsive supply behavior according to factors such
as salary and other market indicators.  Specifically,
this paper will determine whether or not the supply
trends of law students reflect “cobweb-like” labor
market adjustments due to the time lag associated
with entering the labor market.  The second section
will review the relevant literature and provide a theo-
retical framework in which to analyze enrollment
trends.  In the third section, the empirical model will
be discussed and an explanation of the data will be
given.  The fourth section will provide the results and
conclusions of the paper.
“The Law School Admissions
Council (LSAC) is currently pre-
paring for the largest LSAT admin-
istration ever since the previous
record set in the descending
economy of October 1991.”
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II. Theory and Review of Literature
The main theoretical pretext for this paper is
the “Cobweb Model.”   This theory was developed
primarily to explain labor market adjustment in spe-
cialized fields and for some time was only applied to
engineering workers.  The theory explains that if de-
mand for lawyers goes up in a given year, raising
wages, then supply won’t be affected until 3-4 years
later owing to the time it takes to finish a law degree
(Ehrenberg, Smith 2002).
For example, in Figure 1 the wage for law-
yers is at equilibrium at wage W* and the number of
workers is L*.  Assume that there is a change in the
demand for lawyers from Ld1 to Ld2.  In the short
term, the supply cannot adjust to the increase in de-
mand, because of the time it takes to finish law school.
During this lag, the L* supply of lawyers can earn a
wage of W ” thus, creating a vertical supply curve
until a few years later when new lawyers finish school.
This wage of W’ is above the equilibrium wage at
point f, which is the new long run equilibrium created
by the intersection of Ld2 and S.  If people are naïve
and assume that this new wage (W”) is the equilib-
rium wage, then supply will reach L’.  When supply
adjusts, (after school completion) there will be a sur-
plus of lawyers, since W’ is above the long run equi-
librium (Ehrenberg, Smith 2002).
       At this point, the supply of lawyers is temporarily
fixed at L’.  Due to the surplus, the wage will fall to
W”.  This wage is below the new long-run equilib-
rium at point f, therefore supply will adjust by people
moving out of the field and less students deciding to
go to law school.  This completes the trough cycle
bringing the new short run supply to L” at point e.
The cycle will then repeat itself giving the supply points
the appearance of a cobweb.
Cobweb theory was developed to explain
labor market adjustments that do not gravitate
smoothly and quickly toward the market equilibrium.
One of the first applications of this theory was for the
market of the highly trained workers in the field of
engineering (Freeman, 1971).  Although not much
empirical work has connected cobweb theory with
the market for law students, there have been several
applications, and it seems to be accepted by econo-
mists that the field of law is subject to cobweb supply
adjustments (Ehrenberg, Smith 2002).
Richard Freeman (1975) studied the “cob-
web model” as it pertains to the market for law stu-
dents.  The study incorporated a multiple regression
model adapted from previous studies on the labor
market for engineers.  As mentioned earlier, cobweb
theory suggests that if wages were to go up in the
legal sector, the supply of lawyers would not be af-
fected for 3-4 years (owing to the time it takes to
finish law school).  If during this time lag wages were
to fall, then students would be understandably reluc-
tant to leave law school.  Since students have already
entered law school and invested time and money, they
will choose to finish school and receive a degree.
In addition, Freeman separates the determi-
nants of the market for law students into several sec-
tions: supply of first year students, supply of gradu-
ates and salary determination.  Using the results from
these sections, Freeman derived a cobweb cycle
model that relates the amount of enrollment for a given
year to demand shift variables and most importantly
to the number of graduates for that year.  This basic
approach has been used in other studies and theo-
retical papers that discuss cobweb theory (Freeman
1971, Pashigian 1970).  The general framework of
analysis and eventual cobweb model of this paper
references the work mainly, of Freeman but the mod-
els and data sources vary significantly.
Although the applications of cobweb theory
to the market for law students are minimal, other analy-
ses of the market are useful.  Ron Ehrenberg (1988)
Quantity of Labor
L*     L’’               L’
Figure 1: Cobweb Market Adjustment
Wage Rate
b
c
d
a
e
f
w’
w’’
w*
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has analyzed supply shifts in the market for lawyers
from a human capital theoretical perspective.  His
study used primarily salary data to account for the
rational expectations of a career in the legal field.  In
addition, Ehrenberg cites the difficulty of finding reli-
able salary data for attorneys or workers with a legal
degree.  His study was mainly referenced to deter-
mine data sources and possible avenues for the esti-
mation of substitute fields.
       The discovery and analysis of cobweb cycles is
important from a policy perspective.  This is due to
the fact that they may create boom and bust cycles
that can create surpluses and shortages of labor.
Without this information, the Deans and Board of
Trustees at law schools may be increasing admissions
when in fact they should be decreasing or vice versa.
Faced with a potentially overcrowded market, it is
necessary for policy makers to fully understand the
method of adjustment in the complex market for
workers with a legal degree.
III. Empirical Model
This study will separate the determinants of
the market for law students into several different sec-
tions: Supply of first year law students, supply of
graduates, and determinants of salaries in the legal
field.   Using these results, this paper will derive a
model to determine whether or not the market for
law students exhibits “cobweb” like market adjust-
ment when relating the supply of first year law stu-
dents to factors that affect overall demand.  In all equa-
tions, the variables are in log-linear form due to the
double-log model employed in order to analyze co-
efficients in the form of elasticities.  The variables used
and their sources are listed in Figure 2:
A.. Supply  of First Year Law Students
According to cobweb theory, more students
will decide to enter law school if legal salaries are
high, and less when legal salaries are low.  Therefore
we would hypothesize the salaries of legal profes-
sional to have a positive relationship with first-year
enrollment.   On the other hand, we would expect the
salaries in alternate fields to have a negative relation-
ship with enrollment since they would cause a supply
shift in the short run.  To determine the supply of first
year law students, this study uses the dependant vari-
able LENT, which is the total number of first year law
students enrolled in a given year.  This data was ac-
quired from the American Bar Association for the time
period 1987 to 2001 (abanet.com).  The supply of
first year students is determined by the following equa-
tion:
Equation 1: Enrollment Decision
LENT = b1LSAL – b2ASAL1 – b3ASAL2 + u1
Where LSAL is the weekly earnings of work-
ers in legal services converted to yearly earnings and
adjusted using the Consumer Price Index (chained
1984 dollars).  This data is divided by industry so it
includes other workers in the industry that may not
have a legal degree such as court clerks, court re-
porters, paralegals and legal secretaries.  However, it
does include some occupations that are not included
in occupational data such as judges, magistrates, and
arbitrators.  The data for legal services proved to be
the best proxy of wages in the sector since there is no
consistent, compatible data for all workers possess-
ing a legal degree.
The estimate of salaries of other industries that
would affect the enrollment decision are business ser-
vices (ASAL1) and miscellaneous services (ASAL2),
which includes accountants, bookkeepers, architects,
engineers, and various computer-related occupations.
Those choosing not to enroll in law school have a
range of other industries to pursue.  The ASAL1 vari-
able is a proxy for workers who enter into the general
Variable Name Explanation Source
LSAL Number of first year enrolleesat ABA-approved law schools
American Bar
Association
Abanet.org (2002)
ASAL1 Weekly earnings for workersin the legal services industry
Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
Employment and
Earnings. (1987-
2002)
ASAL2
Weekly earnings for workers
in the business services
industry
Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
Employment and
Earnings. (1987-
2002)
LGRAD
Weekly earnings for workers
in the miscellaneous business
specialty industry
American Bar
Association
Abanet.org (2002)
LOUT Revenue in the legal servicesindustry taken as a fraction of
total GDP
U.S. Census
Bureau
The Statistical
Abstract of The
United States
(1993 - 2001)
Figure 2: Variables and Data Source
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business field.  The ASAL2 variable is also a general
proxy for occupations that would serve as alternates
for those who do not decide to attend law school.
These variables do not account for all career paths
open to those who choose not to attend law school
but should serve as an appropriate proxy.
This equation is basically the same as
Freeman’s model for determining salary effects on en-
rollment (Freeman 1975).  However, this study uses
two variables to approximate salaries in alternate fields
where Freeman uses one.  Also, the variables and
data used are from a more current time period and
are from different data sources.
B. Supply of Graduates
The second equation will relate the supply of
graduates in a given year (LGRAD) to salaries during
the first and second year of school.  The supply of
graduates also depends on the level of enrollment 3
years prior.  Using this equation, we test the hypoth-
esis that there is a time lag between the decision to
enter law school (enrollment) and actual entrance into
the workforce (graduation).  According to cobweb
theory, we would expect that salary variables would
have little or no effect on graduation rates because
the value of the training depends upon the receipt of a
degree.    The equation appears below:
Equation 2: Supply Determination
LGRAD(3) = b1[LSAL(1) + LSAL(2)] –
[ASAL (1) + ASAL (2)] +LENT(0) + u2
The dependent variable is LGRAD or the total
graduates that received a legal degree in a given year.
This data was acquired from the ABA and include
only ABA approved law schools.  The number of
graduates depends on the sum of the salaries1of the
two years prior.  The coefficient for this variable should
be positive since there would be greater incentive to
graduate if the salaries in legal services are higher.
However, the coefficient should be small or not sig-
nificant to prove our hypothesis.  The number of gradu-
ates also depends on the sum of the salaries in alter-
nate fields for 2 years prior.  Elasticities with respect
to the summed-salary variables should be relatively
small since students would have already invested in
education where the returns depend upon receipt of
a legal degree.  Also, the coefficient of the salary vari-
able for other fields should be negative.    The key
variable is the number of enrollees three years prior,
which we would expect to have an elasticity close to
one to prove our hypothesis that the supply of gradu-
ates for a given year depends on the enrollment of
three years prior, thus proving the time lag character-
istic of the cobweb model.
This equation is basically Freeman’s model
of retention in law school (1975).  He also used this
same basic equation in his application of cobweb
theory to the market for engineers (1971).  The main
difference in this study is the use of different salary
variables and the application of the model to a more
recent time series.
C. Salary Determination
In equation 3, the salaries for legal services
are made a function of the level of demand and of the
level of graduates during that year.  To estimate the
level of demand this study employs industry revenue
data as a percentage of GDP (LOUT), which is avail-
able through the Statistical Abstract of the United
States (1993-2001).  This is assumed to be an in-
complete estimate of demand but may explain some
of the variance in salaries as a proxy for demand.
The equation is as follows:
Equation 3: Salary Determination
LSAL = -b1LGRAD +b2LOUT + u4
Previous studies suggest that demand shift variables
(LOUT) will have a positive effect on the salaries of
workers with legal degrees (Freeman 1971, 1975).
In this equation, LSAL is also made a function of the
number of graduates during that year (LGRAD) which
should have a negative effect on salaries of workers
with legal degrees since an increase in graduates would
mean an increase in supply.
This equation was taken from Freeman
(1975).  However, this study only uses one demand
proxy and one supply proxy.  The concept is basi-
cally the same, but applied in a simpler form.
D. Cobweb Evaluation
By substituting the salary equation 3 into the
original enrollment equation 1, cobweb phenomena
can be observed.
Equation 4: Cobweb Analysis
LENT(0) = – b1LGRAD(0) +b2LOUT(0) –
b3ASAL(0) + u
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This equation allows us to analyze the cycli-
cal characteristic of the model and allows us to esti-
mate in absence of a more specific variable for salary.
This method can be expressed as a complementary
non-salary model where individual decision depend
more on job opportunities and the numbers seeking
work rather than on salaries in a given field.  In earlier
applications of the cobweb model, both salary fac-
tors and job opportunity variables affected enrollment
decisions (Freeman 1971, 1975).
The most important independent variable in
this equation is LGRAD, which is related to the level
of first-year enrollment in a given year.  If the market
does exhibit cobweb supply adjustment, the LGRAD
variable will explain at least some of the changes in
enrollment in a given year.  We would expect when
more graduates enter the workforce that fewer stu-
dents would choose to enter law school.  Therefore,
we would hypothesize a negative relationship between
the number of graduates in a given year and the en-
rollment for that year.
IV. Results
The initial enrollment decision equation
showed that the salary variables were not significant
except ASAL2.  The expected sign for salaries in le-
gal services was correct with a coefficient of .259 but
was not significant according to the standard tests.The
results for ASAL1 were not as expected since the
coefficient was positive indicating that a rise in the
business services industry will raise the enrollment of
first year law students.  This may be due to the gener-
ality of the data or maybe a correlation between some
of wages paid to clerical workers in both industries.
Table 1 shows the coefficients and significance
values for LSAL, ASAL1, and ASAL2.  The salaries
for alternate fields measured by ASAL2, engineering
and miscellaneous professional specialty, showed to
be highly significant and displayed a large coefficient.
This most likely is due the inclusion of computer engi-
neering and computer related occupations in the
ASAL2 data.  During the late 1990’s there was an
increase in demand for computer workers during the
proliferation of dotcom companies, which may have
lured many potential law students to the computer
industry.
In equation 2, we attempt to prove that while
in law school students are generally not willing to leave
since the value of the training is dependent upon the
receipt of a degree.  The dependent variable is the
number of graduates in a given year, which is then
dependent on salaries in the legal field and alternate
fields, as well as the number of entrants three years
prior or LENT(-3).  The results prove several impor-
tant aspects of our cobweb market structure.
 Table 2: Results of Supply of Graduates for
Equation 1 Constant LSAL ASAL1 ASAL2
Coefficien
(Sig)
13.572
(.00)
.259
(.19)
.370
(.13)
-1.082
(.04)
Years 1987-2001a
R2 = .938
a The dependent variable is the number of graduates from
ABA approved law schools or LGRAD(3).
The coefficient for LENT(0) is the variable
for first year enrollment lagged 3 years.  The coeffi-
cient shows that a large amount of current graduates
depends on enrollment three years earlier and is highly
significant.  In order for the time lag aspect of the
cobweb model to function properly, we must prove
the hypothesis that a significant portion of graduates
depends on enrollment 3 years earlier.  This allows
for the situation where students are unable to respond
to market changes while enrolled due to an invest-
ment that depends upon graduation.  The results of
this equation show that this hypothesis is true.  The
salary values should have low coefficients.  The data
show that the salaries for alternate fields are generally
not significant and the salary coefficient for legal sala-
ries is very small but not significant.
To determine what factors affect the earnings
of workers with a legal degree, Equation 3 relates the
salaries of workers in the legal field to a demand shift
proxy variable and the number of graduates in a given
year.
Table 1: Results of Initial Enrollment Equa-
tion for the Years 1987-2001a
R2 = .261
a The dependent variable is the number of first year enrollees
(LENT).
All variables are in log form.  The numbers in parentheses are
significance values.
Equation 2 Constant LENT(0) ASAL1(1+2)b
ASAL2
(1+2)b
LSAL
(1+2)b
Coefficient
(Sig)
1.061
(.760)
.869
(.016)
-.169
(.30)
.103
(.660)
.0072
(.64)
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The coefficient and significance of the LOUT
variable, which was used as a proxy for the demand
for legal professionals, is somewhat surprising given
that earlier studies had estimated this coefficient be-
tween .30-.45.  The coefficient of LGRAD, or the
number of graduates in a given year, was significant at
the .10 level and has a coefficient of -.565.  With an
R2 of .747, this means that output and the number of
graduates in a given year have a significant effect on
the salary variable.  Specifically, a 1.4% increase in
the amount of graduates in the industry would de-
crease salaries by 1%.
Table 3: Results for Determination of Legal Sala
ries 1987-2001a
of graduates in a given year has a significant effect on
the first-year enrollment for that year.  This is the main
cause of the cyclical characteristic since those enter-
ing the field as graduates made the decision to enter
under different market conditions and may not reflect
demand.  To further demonstrate this, I replaced the
number of graduates with the enrollment variable
lagged 2 and 3 years and the results were similar show-
ing fairly significant coefficients ranging from -.22- (-
.28).
V. Conclusion
The results of this study generate several con-
clusions.  First, there is some degree of salary effect
on the level of first-year enrollment in law schools.  In
equation 1, an R2 of only .27 was obtained, possibly
exhibiting the need for better specification and a bet-
ter estimation of alternate career paths for potential
law students.  However, the coefficients for alternate
salaries were also higher than expected displaying a
greater effect on enrollment than the salaries for work-
ers in that field.  These results are somewhat contrary
to previous literature (Freeman 1975) that tests and
proves a hypothesis of equal effects of salaries in the
field and in an alternate field.  The variable for legal
salaries was not significant, but the high coefficient of
alternate salaries may suggest that the market has been
influenced heavily by supply shift(s) during the time
period of 1987-2001.
In addition, the second equation of the study
showed a high degree of correlation between the num-
ber of graduates and the number of first-year enroll-
ees three years earlier.  The results showed an elas-
ticity of almost 0.9 where we would expect an elas-
ticity close to unity.  However, the results were better
than some previous studies (Freeman 1975) but with
a slightly smaller R2.  Also, the variables used to esti-
mate salaries in the legal field and in substitute fields
during the years of enrollment proved not significant
and gave inconclusive results.  These results are con-
sistent with the cobweb model, which assumes that
once a student makes the decision to enroll they will
not leave due to market conditions (salaries of legal
professionals and alternate occupations).
The results of equation 3 showed that gradu-
ates and a proxy for demand had a significant effect
on the salaries of those in the legal services industry.
Using these results, equation 3 was substituted for
salaries in legal services in the initial enrollment equa-
tion to obtain a cobweb-supply equation.  The results
Equation 3 Constant LGRAD LOUT 1
Coefficient
(Sig)
14.764
(.00)
-.565
(.08)
.677
(.00)
Equation 4 Constant LOUT LGRAD ASAL2
Coefficient
(Sig)
8.378
(.01)
.561
(.06)
-.252
(.12)
-1.082
(.04)
R2= .747
a The dependent variable in Equation 3 is salaries for legal
services converted to yearly earnings and adjusted using CPI
(chained 1984 dollars).
All variables are in log form.  Numbers in parentheses are
significance values.
1 This variable is yearly revenue in the legal services  industry
as a fraction of total GDP and then converted to log form.
Using the first three equations, we can then
substitute equation 3 (salary determination) into equa-
tion 1 (enrollment decision) to create a model that is
based more on job opportunities and the amount of
graduates in the field, and not purely on salary data.
The level of enrollment in a given year can then be
regressed against the amount of graduates for other
demand shift variables.  Table 4 displays the results.
Table 4: Cobweb Analysis of Market for New
Lawyers for Years 1987-2001a
R2= .570  aThe dependent variable is the number of first year
students enrolled in law school.  All variables are
in log form.  Numbers in parentheses are significance values.
The results from the final equation show that
the output of legal services (LOUT) has a significant
effect on the level of first-year enrollment.  The most
important variable, LGRAD, shows that the number
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showed that graduates of a given year had a negative
effect on enrollment for that year.  By running multiple
regressions and substituting enrollment lagged 2 and
3 years, the model showed that past enrollment has a
negative effect on enrollment a few years down the
line.  This shows that the time lag necessary to obtain
a legal degree causes endogenous cyclical cycles that
affect enrollment.  This proves the hypothesis that the
market for law students displays cobweb like supply
adjustments.  Also, due to the coefficient for salaries
in alternate fields being so high, it is possible that there
was a significant supply shock(s) that has decreased
enrollments.
This is important to policy makers of law
schools and proponents of the legal industry as en-
rollments skyrocket during 2002-2003.  This study
suggests that a large part of the supply of law stu-
dents may be due to the low level of graduates from
this year and the last couple of years that are now
obtaining salaries above the equilibrium.  This short-
age of sorts, coupled with shrinking salaries in alter-
nate fields may cause a boom that will then drive down
salaries for workers with a legal degree and leave
many unemployed.  Current salaries may be over-
stating the true demand for legal professionals.
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